激情综合网欧美

🦈　　[环球时报特约记者程东]国民党主席江启臣🚃接受采🐃访时声称“大陆是🚫台湾面临的主要威胁”，引发大陆和国民党内部的强烈反弹💴

🙇人大依法监督“一府一委两院”的工作，这🔌既是一种制约，又是支持和促进，有利于提高国家治理的效能🔷

👴　　自阿斯利康通知欧盟该集团无法完全履行对欧盟的疫苗交🐹付义务之后，欧盟与英国双方就一直在疫苗出口问题上僵持不😭下，且紧张程度正在不断加深，市场正担心此次冲突可能会🔉对英国脱欧📔后脆弱的贸易协议构成风险😠

❔请介绍一下，人民法院主要做了哪些工作？　　最高人民法院工作报告起草组：审判执行质效直接关乎老百姓对司法的获得感乃至对法治的信赖🔋

❓　　“四巫日”当天，股票、股指的期货和期权大量交易，有🐰时，投资者平🛃掉的仓位可以和新建仓🐥位抵消，金融产品不会出现过度供给或过度🏀需求🎌

👝　　在胡润中国百富榜上排名第二和🎖第三的分别是腾讯创始人马化腾（4800😖亿元）和拼多多创始人黄峥🖖（4500亿元），马云（3600亿元）名列中国第四🆑

📈但这并不能改变原版真卡的价值🎾

🐀而如今，受拜登最新的刺激法案影响，流动性泛滥正式开始🐉

🌸　　3月22日下午，国🦋家工业和信息化部就修改《中华人民共和国烟草专卖法实施条例》公开征求意见，拟在附则中增加一条，作为第六十五条：“电子烟等新型烟草制品参照本条例中关于卷烟的有关规😽定执行📇

💙创业板指跌2.81%；权重蓝筹代表上证50跌2.6👩%🥘

🍺而且，新业务价值是最直接衡量寿险公司经营结构的指标🔏

📛下载新浪财经APP，了解全球实时汇率　　英文实录　　Q：OnMarch11，🐸Preside💝nt Bidenformallysigneda$1.9trilli🤵onstimulusplan．Itisstillindisputewhetherthisroundofstimulusistoomuchthatma🌛yleadtoraginginflationorinsuff📽icientthatmayplungetheUSintotheriskofrecession.W🙎hati👴syourviewonthisandwhy？　　A🌯：It’sappropriatetopr🕸ovide🏵relieftotheUnitedStateswhichisstillstrugglingtocomeou🥍tofthisCOV🍸IDreces🐑sion．We’veseenalotofimprovementintheincidenc🍓eofthedisease，wehavesigni🐘ficantincrease⬅sinvaccinesuppl🎌yanddistribu📟tion．Whilealloftheseactionsareveryexpensive，thegovernmentcertainlyneedstoprovidetheresou🤑rc🗾estofundt🐡hesecovidreliefactions.Manybusinessesarestillstrugglingintheaftermathofthis🔹recordplungeintheeconomy．So，it’sapprop✉riatetoenactthistypeofareli🆙efbill．Ihesitatetocallitastimulus．It’smoreofareliefforacovid-andcris📚is-batteredUSeconomy．　　Q：WhatareyourexpectationsforUSeconomicrecoveryinthe🕐next3years？Howdoyouexpectinflationtochange？Doyo⛴uhaveanyforecasttoshare？　　A：Ithinktheeconomyisgoingt🎑obeverystronginthefirsthalf📭of2021．ButIsuspectthatthegrowthratewillslowaswe😎movethroughthecourseoftheyearand📔into2😥022．Manyoftheactions🤭thatarebeingputinplacer🌞ightnowaretem⛩porary，andsoastheywearoffth🐧ee💷con🍓omywillgobac😴ktoitspre-covidgrowthrate🧚．　　IalsofearandI’vewrittenab🤭outthisrecentlythatalotofthepent-updema🔌ndthatha😯sbeendefe🔟rredduringthecrisishasalreadybeenreleasedorisintheprocessofbeingreleasedrightnow．So，🤝inmanyrespects，especiallywhenlookinga🏇tconsum👈erspendingondurablegoo🏆dslikecars，furnitureandappliances，alotofthespendingthathasoccurredandisoccu🛅rringr🎙igh🔝tnowisborrowingfromdemandthatwouldhavebeenevidentlaterthisyearor❕early2022．So，Ithinktheg📲rowthrateisfront-loa👊dedandt💺hesupportdownthe🍙roadisstillverymuchinquestion．　　Asforrising🚋inflation，th🌆ebond🏆marketiscertainlyconcerneda📬boutthatpossib🐩ility🌧．Ithinkthosefearsareoverblown，however．Yes，therewillbeapickupintheinflationratein⛄thefirsthalfofthisyearbutinlargepartthatisbecausetheco❤mparisonswitha🏷year🤸earlierarever✔yfav⏹orable．ButIthinktheunderlyinginflationrateissti📣llgoi🗼ngtoremainatorevenslightl🎫ybelow2%overthenextseveralyears．EvenifI’mwrong，theinflationratewouldnotbeappreciablyabovethat．TheworstIcouldseewouldbemaybe2.5%．　　TheFe🎦deralReserveBoardhasindicatedthatbecauseinfla😶tionhasbeensomuchlowerthanithadbeentargetin🌭gforabout8or9years，tha🛶t📈itiswillingtotolerateabove-targetinflationforafewyearswithoutamajortighteningofmonetarypolicy．Thebondmarketseems🧑tobedisputingthat，butFedChairJeromeP🚐owellmadeaverystrongdefenseofthatstrategyattheconclusionofthisweek’sFOMCmee🚂ting．Ithinkhewillstandbyhisposition—barri👓ngnewevidenceofamoreseriousshiftininflatio📵naryexpectations．　　Q：TheBidenadministrationisconsideri🥢ngfurthers📐timulusmeasures📠，includingtrillionso🔳fUSDonin😠frastructureconstruction，inadditiontoth🧜e$1.9tr😮illionplan.Moreover，the🤔governmentisalsoconsideringamajorfederaltaxincre🍤ase．However，theproportionofUSgovernmentdebttoGD😇Phasreachedarecordhigh，andtheoversupplyofUSdebth🕤ascausedconcerns．　　Wha🎭tareyourexpectat🌸i🛬o👞nsforthescaleoftheinfrastructureprojects？Howmuchmorespa🌰ceisthereforfiscalstimulus？Cantaxin🎅creaseseffectivelysupplyenoug📝hfundsforfiscalexpenditures？Howdoyouseethepossibilityofa🍩debtcrisi😱sinth🛐e😽USgovernme🏒nt？　　A：Thereisalot⬜ofdisc🍝ussionabouttheso-called“buildback”programthatfo🌬cusesoni🅿nfrastructure．Americadesperatelyneedstoimproveitsageinginfrastructureinsomanyareas，in🕸cl🚣udingroads，highways，bridges，and🌝por🛁tfacilities．　　Therei🆔snoquestionaboutthen🦓eed．Buttheorderofmagnituderemainsunknown，andtheBidenadmi✅n🎃istrati♋onhasn😆o🚇tde🏾tailed🕘itsintentionsinthisarea🚓yet．Typicall🍒y，whenwetal🗻kabo🈶utinfrastructure🐳plans，weusuallyspeako🦗fprogramssomewherearoun➖datrilliondollars．ButthatisjustaguessbasedonearlierproposalsdatingbacktotheObamaadministration，whichwantedtodoitbutwasunabletogetthatthroughtheUSCo🐟ngress．　　Canweaffordye⏸tanotherlarges😓pendingprogram？That’sthe🏣biggestquestion．Wehavedebt-to🏏-GDPratiosrightnowthatarehigherthanthereh🛴ave⛱beenatany🆎pointsincet📶heendofWWII．ButtheDemocratsandthoseadvocates👙oftheso-calledMo🏑dernMonetaryTheorysay✳“don’tworry．”Theysaythatbecauseinterestexpe💾nses🔲onthefederaldebtareexceedinglyl🙋owrightnow，almostatrecordlows，asashareofGDP—somewhere🥦around1-2%，dependinguponwhichmeasureofnetinterestthatyou’veused．　　Ofcourse，thereisnosecrettowhytheyarelow．IthasnothingtodowithModernMonetaryTheory— itsimplyistha🔸ttheFederalReserveBoardisanchoringinterestratesatexceedinglyl📃owlevels．Thatmeansthat💏theFe🔬dissubsidizingwhatmightotherwisehave🛠beenamassiveoverhangofinterestpaymentsthatotherwisewouldh👄avebeenve🏈ryproblematicfortheUS😀economy．　　TheFedhasb⛷ecomeapartnerinAmerica’sfiscaladventures．Itspolic🚷iesofextraordinarym🥝onetaryaccommodationareabso😋lu⛰telyessentialfortheUSwithitsoutsizeddebt-to-GDPratioandam🏏bit😿iontotakethatratioevenhigherbecaus🎛eofunmetin🙌frastr🏾uctureneeds．Thatmeanstheinter💴playbetweenfiscalandm❔onetarypolicyisa😤bsolutelyessentialtopreventanythingcloset🌐oad🚜ebtcri🍗sis．　　Asl🕧ongastheFedkeepsinterestratesaslowastheyare，wewillnothaveadebtcrisis，butgiventherecorddebt-to😝-GDPratio，itwillnottakemuchofaFedtighteningtocausethatt💆obeaseriousproblem．　　Q：TheFOMCde🏽claredonlastW🌹ed😥nesdaytomaintainthebenchmarkinterestrateatar🤣ound0．FedChairPowellsaidtheFedwillnottightenpoliciesuntilthere🚥issubstantialinflationth🍱atsustainatover2%．Butontheotherhand，theFedhasraisedi🧦tsinflationexpe🕳ctationandincreasedtheexpectedPCEinf✝lationto2.4%．　　Combiningtheabovetwostatements，howdoyouu🦌nderstandtheFed’sstanceo💋ninflation？InwhatsituationwilltheFedstarttotig🚵htenpolicies😸，andhowlongwillitlast？　　A：Thereareafewpiecestothepuzzleyou’vejustidentified．　　LastsummertheFedad🚧optedanews⛄trategyfortheconductofmo💯netarypolicycalledaverageinflatio🖇n🚪targeting．Thi🛠sisaimedataddressingthesurprisinglylo🐢w，below-targetoutcomeforUSinflatio🍻nove🥍rthelast8to9years．TheFedhashada2%pricestabilitytargetasmeas🕕uredbytheso-calledPCEdefl🌬at🖲or，andtheaverageinflat🌬io📲nrateoverthatperiodhasbeencloseto1.5%．Averageinf🛴lationtargetingsaysthattheFedisnowusinga2%averageasamulti-yeart🚢arget．Consequently，anover🎡shootinanyoneortwoyearswouldstillkeepth👶ethree-to-fiveyearinflationrateatorbelow2%，wh☔ichisnotofactionabl🚮econsequences🍨formonetarypolicy．　　If，however，theyseethei🈲nflationrateonatrajectorythatseemstobemovingt🔔owell🍋above2.5%andli⏪kelytos🌝ta🎤ythere，thentheywillbegin，asChairPowellsaidattheFOMCmee👉ti🕍ng，topreparethemarkets😠fort📁ighteningofmonetarypolic👵y．Hewasveryclearthattoavoidthet🦒yp🗿eofchaosthatwehadseveralyearsagowiththeso-calledtapertantrum，tha🚫thewouldsendthatwarningwellinadvanceof🚙th🚨eFed’smovesonpolic💽y．Ihappentothink😫thattheFedismakingamistakehere🥕．Butyouaskedmewhatheisgoingtodo，andIthinkheis🥋ver🕶ycl🍗earinwhatheisintendingtodoinlightoftheirnewoperatingprocedureofaverageinflationtargeting．　　Q：Powell’sstatementshaveledsometoworry😡theFedwillactt🕗oolate–theeconomywillalre🤤adybeoverheatedwhenonedayitfinallystartstocutdownbondpurchaseorraisetheinterestrate.Doyousharethisconcern？Whatmayhappe⛰niftheFedactstoolate？　　A：Underaverageinf😳lation🤚targeting，itisimportanttostressthattheFedi🌘st😧ellingthemarketsthatitwantstoacttoolate．There’sjustthequestion🛀oftheconsequencesofwhat“🔆toolate”means．Iftheec🍼o😦nomyisseriouslyoverheated—saywe’vegoneback🍅towardfulle🈳mploymentofaround3.5%，asitw🛎aspre-COVIDandthereareadditionalsignsofstrainsin🔥productmarkets，🥘andGDPgrowthiswellaboveitslong-termt🤷rendof3-3.5%，thenitwouldbetoolate.Theyieldcurvewouldhavesteepenedalot💸andtheFedwouldhavemadeaseriousmistake．　　Butiftheeconomyissettledbacktoa💸rateofperformanceintermsofgrowthandsignsofpressureinlaborandprod🧔uctmarketsthatarenotnearlyastightastheywere🗃priortotheonsetofCOVID，thentheFedmaynotbe“toolate”eveniftheinflationhasovershottemporarilyits2%pricestabilitytarget．　　Q：The10-🖐YearTreasurybondnowhasayieldofnearly1.7%．Isitnecessaryfo💌rth🐴eFedtoadoptOperationTwisttoc🦖ontrolit？WhatscenarioortimingmaytriggertheOperationTwist？Whatothertoolsareavaila🈴ble？Whatarethepossibleeffectsoft🥜hesetools？　　A：Operationtw📝isti⛵ssomethingthattheFedtriedin2011afterQE2followingtheglobalfinancialcrisis．Ithadmixedresults．Cer🧤tainlytheFed，liketheBankofJapan，c📪ouldtilttheco🧀mposi🚋tionofitsassetpurc😠hase🚹sm🚡oretowardthelongendoftheyield🚳curveinanefforttocontrollong-terminter🐘estrates．Butthatsucceedsonlyifth🛌emarketsarenotfearfulofasharpaccelerationofinflation．Ifi🔳nflationaryexpectationsreallystartto👔dete🔅riorate，operationtwist🐭willnotsucceed．　　📆So，ChairPowellisusinganothertoolrightnowtotrytoc🙉onvincethebondmarketthattheirconcer💴nsoverasustainedriseininflationa❤reoverblown．Thisisanaspectofcom👩munication policycalled“jaw-boning”— usingtheFed’s“bul➰lypul🤗pit”totrytomakethecasetothebondmarket📳thatitshouldnotwor🛀ryaboutinflation．Itistoosoontotelliftheseeffortshavebeensuccessfulo🏅rnot，butthedayafterPowell’🏐spressconference，the&n🐅bsp;marketsr🤧aisedseriousdou🔟btsaboutthewisdomofhisassess🛤ment．　　Ultimatelybeuptothemarketastohowitviewstheinflationoutcome．ItwillalsobeuptotheFedtodecidehowitfeelsabo🐋utasteepeni🔆n🔷goftheyieldcurvethatreflectsthefactthatthemarketsthink⏭thattheUScentralbankislaggingth💹eappropriatestanceofshould🧛berequiredinarisinginfla🦂tionaryenvironment．　　Q：Atpresent，marketexpectationsforthetimingoftheFed‘sinterestratehikehaveshiftedfo😰rw🕚ardfromthe🏇b🔗eginningof2024to20👃23ore🏌ventheendo🏂f2022．Inyouropinion📼，whenwilltheFedraiseinterestrat🆒es？Willtheglobalfinancialmarketsuf🚃ferthetaper🐯tantrum🖐of2013again？Wi🦍lltherebeaglobalfinan🌖cialcrisisin2021，orwhatarethelocalrisksworthyofattention？WillemergingmarketsincludingChinafa🍯cegreaterp🚩ressureofcapitaloutflow💕？　　A🐣：T🛃heFedisverysensitivetotheriskofmark😣etdisruptions，andso🐨ChairPowellinhispressconferencewentoutofhiswaytoindicat💣eth🗳atheisawareofwhathappenedduringthetapertantrumof20🔃13．Is🕋uspe🕉ctthathe🌮willmakeeveryefforttoavoidthatinthecurrentinstance．Hestressedseveraltimesinhispressconferencethathewouldprovide🐪amplewarningofanynormalizationo💖fmonetaryp🌖o🙇licy🦁．　　Butthereisalimittowhatthecentralbankcan🖼dotoaddresssomeoftheforcesthatcoulddestabilizefinancialmarkets．Ihappentobelieverightno📻wtheUnited🈶Statesi🎠smovingintoaveryworrisomeperiodwi🆖thawideningcurrentaccountde🗺ficit．Whencountriesgetintoaproblemwiththeircurrentaccountdefici🌞t–ourde🚢ficitri🦏ghtnowisabout3.5✒%ofGDPandgettingal🆒otwiderbecauseofourenormousbu📣dgetdeficits–oneofthetwothingsthatusuallyhappen：interestratesgouporthecurrencygoesdown．🍬　　ThelongertheFedresistsadjustinginterestrates，thegreate🤲rt🕥hepressureyou’llseeonthevalueoftheUSdollar．The⏯dollarhadcomedo😥wnabout12%fromitsleve🚢linMarch2020🧟．It📺’snowbackedupabout2percentagepoints，soit’sdown，onbalanceabout10%from🤠itshighsofayearago．　　B👚utthereisa🚐re🎽alriskthatit😳couldfallalotfurtheroverthebalanceofthisyearand🌸into2022．Thatcouldactuallybemoredisruptivet💐o🥔worldfinancialmarketsthanashort-terminflationsurprise．Itju🐆stundersco🔢resthefactthatbykeepingmoneta🏎rypolicysoextraordinarilylooseforsolong，t🏭herealriskhereisoneoffinancialinstability．We’veseenseveralinstancesoffinancialinstabilit🔵yinthelast20yearsthathavebeenverydisruptiveto🛑theworld–theburstingofthedotcombubble，thehousingbubble，thecreditbubble，andsoon．Inmanyrespe🍠ct📖stheriskofthedollarispartofthatsamecontinuumofproblems，areflectionofmonetarypolicythatstaysfartooeas📆yfor📹fartoolong．　　Wh🎦attheFedhasfailedtodorepeatedlyoverthelast20yearsistonormalizepost-bubb🖨lemonetar📜ypolicy㊙．Forexample，intheearly2000s，ittookthefederalfundsr🥄atedownveryverylowto1%andheldittherefortoolo💭ng．The Feddidthatafterthedotcombubblebecausei🚖twasafraidthatt🌵heUSwouldturnin🔪tothene🔄xtJapan．Itfeltthatpossibilitywasseriousenoughtorequirepushingitsbench💥markpolicyratedownto“emergency”levels．Yetwhentheemergencypassed，theFedstillkeptratesverylow．　　Thesamethingoccu🤓rred💍af🦀tertheglobalfinancial🎋crisis，anotheremergencyshiftinmonetarypolicy．🎃Onceagain，theeme🕥rgencye🚬ndedafewyearslaterbuttheFedkeptrateslowforaverylo🏼ngtime🕦．Now，itisdoingthesa🗑methingagain．　　Unfor🍉tunately，thatmeanstheFeddoesn’tha🌈vethecouragetoretu🌈rnitspolicytomorenormalsettings．Thatsetsmarketsupforyetanotheraboutoffinanci🛬alinstability.AndIfearthistimethatwillshowupina🍲sharpweaken🎳ingoftheUSdollar．　　Ifthedollargoesdownsharplythenothercurrencieswillrise，inclu🔨dingtheRenminbi.TheRMBinrealterm📈shasbeenrisingsteadilyforoverten♒years．Bu🚅twithasharpdollardecline，thatincreasewillbeexaggeratedandthatcouldprove🍏&nbs😢p;difficultfo💘rChineseexporters．　　Q：Sincetheoutbreakofthepandemic，theU🏒Smacroecon⏹omicpolicyhasenteredanerawh📓erefiscalpolicyplaysadominatingroleandmon🔠etarypolicycoordinatingone．Whyhassuchachangeoccurred？H🍋owwillthisaffectfiscalandmonetarypoliciesinother💿countries？ShouldChinatightenitsmonetarypolicy（including🎣ra🍨isinginterestrate）earlierthantherestoftheworld？　　A：Oneofthemainreasonsthattheroleshavereversedwithfi🙆scalpolicyb⏹ecomi📗ngmo🎋redominantisthatmonetarypolicyisatitslimit．Thepolicyrateiszero，th❔eFe🔠dbalancesheetisatareco⏮rdsha🖖reofGDP．Yet，tob📝eperfectlyhonest，thereisabigdebateastowhetherornottheseextraordi🖖naryactionsareevenworking．　　Butwithcentral🥠banksoutofammunition，theonlyroletheyarereallyplayinghereotherthancreatingemergencylendingprogramsduringperiodsofcrises📵ist🚌oenablemassivefiscalstimulusbykeepingnetinterestpayme🐌ntsexceedinglylowandfallingasashareofGDP．You’veaskedmeifmonetarypolicyisplayingmoreofacoordinatingroletosupportmoreactivistfiscalauthor🎾ities🕌．ButIwouldsayit’splaying🤜moreofanenablingrolewhereitcreatestheveryeasyfinancingco💅nditionsforthefiscalauthoritytoboostgovernmentspendingasbigasneverbefore．　　Thereareconsequencesinthat．Therear📓ediffere🌑ntconsequen💸cesford🅰ifferentnati😷onsan🔄deconomies．ButinthecaseoftheUnitedStates，theconsequencesare，asIsaidearlier，awideni✊ngandlargecurrentaccountdefi🏝cit，withim📏portant🧕implicationsforaweakerUSdollar📺．　　IstherealessonthatChinacanlearnfromthis？🍀IthinkChinaha🤮slearnedalessonfromthisbecausewhenIspeaktoCh📅ineseofficialsandcentral🧗bank🐢ers，theyareverymindfuloftherisksandfinanc🕘ialinstabilityt🐏hathaveoccurreddurin📂gthisperiodofultra-eas🈵ymo➿netarypolicy．Partlyasar🐎es🚈ult，thePeople’sBankofChinahasnottakenitspolicyratetozero，orembracedanaggressivequan🈸titativeea🧡sing．Chinahasbeenmoreawareoftheneedtorestorepolicytomorenorma🕒lsettingsonceaneasingcycleisconclud🔟ed．　　So，quitehonestly，Ithinkcentralbanksinth🌚edevelopedworl🤸dc🔌ouldactuallylearnalessonfromChina，ratherthanChin🏴alearningale❄ssonf🏽romus．IntheWest，we’retakinggreatriskwithmonetarypolic🌇iesthatcouldcreateseriousproblemsdowntheroad．Jus🗑tbecausetheredoesn🚜’tseemtobeaseriousproblemrightnowdoesn’tmeantherewon’tbeoneinthefuture．Infact，📷inthepast，thereweresevera📽loccasionsinthelas♓t20yearsw👔herewe’🙌vehadcrises⛩thatwereadirectoutgrowth⏸ofunusuallystimulativemonetarypolicy．🚃　　Addit⛅ionalthough📁ts：　　Therearemanyquestionsthatgetraisedwithrespecttot🥨heinflationoutl🏉ookitself：Whyithasb⏭eensolow？Whetheritcouldrea🔨cc📑eleratesh🌧arplyinashortperiodoftime？Wehonestlydon’thaveaclearun✊derstandingofhowtoaddresst🔙hesereallyimportantissues．⚪　　TheonlythingIwouldaddt🥘othatisthataswesawintheUnitedStates🧚inthepre-C♟OVIDperiod，wewererunningap🆘rettyhoteco⬛nomywithanunemploymentrateatlevelsithadnotbeenatinover50years；andyetwewerenotseeinganysignifica✉ntpickupininflation．　　Itmaywellbethatinaneraofglobalization，w🙀ithsupplychainsandrapidtechnologicalchan📇ge，thatinflationismoreofaglobalphenomenonthanalocal🏋orco🚒untry-specificphenomenon．Yetwe🥟conductmonetarypolicylargelybas🦎edonnationalconsi🎶dera🏼tionsratherthanonthebasisofglobalconsiderat🐙ionsandwetargetnationalinflationrathe💐rthanglobalinfl🏦ation．　　Itisabsolutelycriticalforustohaveadeeperunderstanding&